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To say that emotions are cognitions is to say nothing. We
understand cognition even less than we understand emotions (with
the exception of the mechanics of cognition). To say that
emotions are caused by cognitions or cause cognitions
(emotivism) or are part of a motivational process – does not
answer the question: "What are emotions?". Emotions do cause us
to apprehend and perceive things in a certain way and even to
act accordingly. But WHAT are emotions? Granted, there are
strong, perhaps necessary, connections between emotions and
knowledge and, in this respect, emotions are ways of perceiving
the world and interacting with it. Perhaps emotions are even
rational strategies of adaptation and survival and not
stochastic, isolated inter-psychic events. Perhaps Plato was
wrong in saying that emotions conflict with reason and thus
obscure the right way of apprehending reality. Perhaps he is
right: fears do become phobias, emotions do depend on one's
experience and character. As we have it in psychoanalysis,
emotions may be reactions to the unconscious rather than to the
world. Yet, again, Sartre may be right in saying that emotions
are a "modus vivendi", the way we "live" the world, our
perceptions coupled with our bodily reactions. He wrote: "(we
live the world) as though the relations between things were
governed not by deterministic processes but by magic". Even a
rationally grounded emotion (fear which generates flight from a
source of danger) is really a magical transformation (the ersatz
elimination of that source). Emotions sometimes mislead. People
may perceive the same, analyze the same, evaluate the situation
the same, respond along the same vein – and yet have different
emotional reactions. It does not seem necessary (even if it were
sufficient) to postulate the existence of "preferred" cognitions
– those that enjoy an "overcoat" of emotions. Either all
cognitions generate emotions, or none does. But, again, WHAT are
emotions?
We all possess some kind of sense awareness, a perception of
objects and states of things by sensual means. Even a dumb, deaf
and blind person still possesses proprioception (perceiving the
position and motion of one's limbs). Sense awareness does not
include introspection because the subject of introspection is
supposed to be mental, unreal, states. Still, if mental states
are a misnomer and really we are dealing with internal,
physiological, states, then introspection should form an
important part of sense awareness. Specialized organs mediate
the impact of external objects upon our senses and distinctive
types of experience arise as a result of this mediation.
Perception is thought to be comprised of the sensory phase – its
subjective aspect – and of the conceptual phase. Clearly
sensations come before thoughts or beliefs are formed. Suffice
it to observe children and animals to be convinced that a
sentient being does not necessarily have to have beliefs. One
can employ the sense modalities or even have sensory-like
phenomena (hunger, thirst, pain, sexual arousal) and, in
parallel, engage in introspection because all these have an
introspective dimension. It is inevitable: sensations are about
how objects feel like, sound, smell and seen to us. The
sensations "belong", in one sense, to the objects with which
they are identified. But in a deeper, more fundamental sense,
they have intrinsic, introspective qualities. This is how we are
able to tell them apart. The difference between sensations and
propositional attitudes is thus made very clear. Thoughts,
beliefs, judgements and knowledge differ only with respect to
their content (the proposition believed/judged/known, etc.) and
not in their intrinsic quality or feel. Sensations are exactly
the opposite: differently felt sensations may relate to the same
content. Thoughts can also be classified in terms of
intentionality (they are "about" something) – sensations only in
terms of their intrinsic character. They are, therefore,
distinct from discursive events (such as reasoning, knowing,
thinking, or remembering) and do not depend upon the subject's
intellectual endowments (like his power to conceptualize). In
this sense, they are mentally "primitive" and probably take
place at a level of the psyche where reason and thought have no
recourse.
The epistemological status of sensations is much less clear.
When we see an object, are we aware of a "visual sensation" in
addition to being aware of the object? Perhaps we are only aware
of the sensation, wherefrom we infer the existence of an object,
or otherwise construct it mentally, indirectly? This is what,
the Representative Theory tries to persuade us, the brain does
upon encountering the visual stimuli emanating from a real,
external object. The Naive Realists say that one is only aware
of the external object and that it is the sensation that we
infer. This is a less tenable theory because it fails to explain
how do we directly know the character of the pertinent sensation.
What is indisputable is that sensation is either an experience
or a faculty of having experiences. In the first case, we have
to introduce the idea of sense data (the objects of the
experience) as distinct from the sensation (the experience
itself). But isn't this separation artificial at best? Can sense
data exist without sensation? Is "sensation" a mere structure of
the language, an internal accusative? Is "to have a sensation"
equivalent to "to strike a blow" (as some dictionaries of
philosophy have it)? Moreover, sensations must be had by
subjects. Are sensations objects? Are they properties of the
subjects that have them? Must they intrude upon the subject's
consciousness in order to exist – or can they exist in the
"psychic background" (for instance, when the subject is
distracted)? Are they mere representations of real events (is
pain a representation of injury)? Are they located? We know of
sensations when no external object can be correlated with them
or when we deal with the obscure, the diffuse, or the general.
Some sensations relate to specific instances – others to kinds
of experiences. So, in theory, the same sensation can be
experienced by several people. It would be the same KIND of
experience – though, of course, different instances of it.
Finally, there are the "oddball" sensations, which are neither
entirely bodily – nor entirely mental. The sensations of being
watched or followed are two examples of sensations with both
components clearly intertwined.
(continued)
About Author :
Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism
Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is
a columnist for Central Europe Review, United Press
International (UPI) and eBookWeb and the editor of mental health
and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory,
Suite101 and searcheurope.com.
Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com
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